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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILFORD N. HANSEN and VADA J. 
HANSEN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
JOHN J. STEWART and ALICE E.K. 
STEWART, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Respondents 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action is to determine the rights of the parties to a strip of 
property bounded on the north by and east-west line 620 feet south of 
the north fence line of Respondents1 pasture and bounded on the south by 
an existing fence, claimed by Respondents to be their southern boundary 
(see map attached to Appellants Brief). The action was originally 
termed a quiet title action. However, Appellants concede that the 
action might more properly be termed one in ejectment. 
Respondents stipulated prior to trial that they have no claim to 
the disputed property through boundary by agreement or acquiescence, 
adverse possession, or prescriptive easement and have acquired no title 
thereto except under their deed from Albern Allen, a comiDn grantor of 
Appellants1 and Respondents1 properties. 
The single issue for trial was the original location of the 
Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34, Providence Survey of Farms. 
Respondents claimed shortly before trial that their surveyor, Randy 
Bott, by recent survey, had determined that the Northeast corner of Lot 
12, Block 34 Providence Survey of Farms relied upon by Appellants and 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Supreme Court No. 19393 
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others was 33 feet north of its original location and that Appellants 
were as a matter of law (see Exhibit 8) required to move their corner to 
a point 33 feet south which Respondents believed would entitle them to 
possession of the disputed ground. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondents were granted a jury trial over Appellants' objections. 
The jury found in favor of Respondents. Appellants moved for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. Appellants1 Motion was 
denied. Appellants now appeal both the Judgment of the District Court 
and the denial of their Motion. 
RELIEF SOUGOT ON APPEAL 
Appellants respectfully request that the Judgment entered in favor 
of Respondents be vacated, and that judgment be entered in favor of 
Appellants or that a new trial be granted. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
1. The facts relevant to a determination of the location of the 
Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 Providence Survey of Farms are not 
in dispute (see Appellants1 Brief, Summary of Evidence, p. 2-7 and 
compare with Defendantsf Brief, Statement of Facts, p. 2-3). 
2. Respondents1 measurements to known points on the ground do not 
differ significantly from those presented by Appellants. 
3. The location points for the Southeast corner of Lot 12, Block 
34 and the Northeast corner of Lot 17, Block 8 (see map attached to 
Appellants' Brief) are agreed upon and the distance between them is 
agreed to be 2733 feet. 
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4. The distances and descriptions set forth in the various deeds 
are not disputed. 
5. The existence and location of various fences are accepted. 
6. The existence and location of the present lines of possession 
are not disputed (except for a single Hansen/Stewart boundary). 
7. The purpose of the various plats submitted was agreed upon. 
8. All surveyors agree that there is no original monument at the 
location of the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34, Providence Survey 
of Farms. 
9. All parties agree that, in spite of the representation of a 
4-rod rod on some of the unofficial plats of the area, only a 33-foot 
gravel lane has ever been established on the ground. 
10. All surveyors agree that all of the deeds in the area will 
require reformation in the event Respondents prevail (T.V.II, pp.38-39, 
p. 139). 
11. All parties agree that the Northeast corner of Lot 12, Block 
34, Providence Survey of Farms as relied upon by the deed writers and as 
actually possessed is at the location claimed by Appellants. 
ARGUMENTS 
Appellants submit the following arguments in reply to the points 
raised in Respondents' Brief. 
The location of the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34, 
Providence Farm Survey was the single issue to be determined at trial. 
If the above phrase means "the location of the Northeast Corner of 
Lot 12, Block 34, Providence Farm Survey as intended by the cairoon 
grantor of the parties and as used as the beginning point in Appellantsf 
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deeds11 then the matter is easily resolved in favor of Appellants. 
Respondents do not dispute, and in fact their evidence supports the 
contention that the corner as possessed and relied on is and has always 
been at the location Appellants claim (T.V. II,p. 128-129) . Respondents 
merely claim that the corner was relied upon by mistake since it was 
first established. 
If the above phrase means "the location of the Northeast Corner of 
Lot 12, Block 34, Providence Farm Survey as intended by the original 
surveyor" which being once established is a point on the earth which 
cannot be moved as a matter of law, the trial court should have 
determined whether the corner was 
(a) an existent corner 
(b) an obliterated corner 
(c) a lost corner. 
Dorsey v. Ryan, Ill.App. 442 N.E.2d 689 (1982) citing the Bureau of Land 
Management's manual of Instructions for the Survey of the Public Lands 
of the United States: 
(W) e think that the authorities differentiate 
between three types of corners, two of which may be 
relied upon to ascertain a lost corner. In the 
manual previously referred to, three different types 
of corners are noted and defined. 
An existent corner is one whose position can be 
identified by verifying the evidence of the monument 
or its accessories, by reference to the description 
in the field notes, or located by an acceptable 
supplemental survey record, some physical evidence, 
or testimony. 
San Juan County v. Ayer, 604 P. 2d 1304 (Wash.App. , 1980) citing the 
Manual of Instructions for the Survey of the Public Lands of the United 
States-1973, Sections 5-9 at p.130 (1973 Manual): 
6 
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An obliterated corner is one at whose point there 
are no remaining traces of the monument or its 
accessories, but whose location has been 
perpetuated, or the point for which may be recovered 
beyond reasonable doubt by the acts and testimony of 
the interested landowners, competent surveyors, or 
other qualified local authorities, or witnesses, or 
by some acceptable record evidence. 
A lost corner is a point of a survey whose position 
cannot be determined, beyond reasonable doubt, 
either from traces of the original marks or from 
acceptable evidence or testimony that bears upon the 
original position, and whose location can be 
restored only be reference to one or more 
interdependent (i.e., nearby, adjacent) corners. 
Manual Section 5-20 at 133. 
A proportionate measurement is one that gives equal 
relative weight to all parts of the line. The 
excess or deficiency between two existent corners is 
so distributed that the amount given to each 
interval bears the same proportion to the whole 
difference as the record length of the interval 
bears to the whole record distance. Manual Section 
5-24 at 133. 
(see also Dorsey v. Ryan, Ill.App. 442 N.E.2d 689 
(1982) supra.) • 
All parties agree that there is no survey monument at the corner. 
The corner is therefore by definition either an obliterated corner or a 
lost corner (Manual of Surveying Instructions - 1973, p. 129 f f). 
If the corner is obliterated then its location must have been 
perpetuated by ffbest evidence1! beyond a reasonable doubt. Henrie v. 
Hyer, 70 P. 2d 154, 156 (Utah 1937) quoting from the General Land Office 
pamphlet 1909 on Restoration of Lost or Obliterated Corners, etc. p.5: 
An obliterated corner is one where no visible 
evidence remains of the work of the original 
surveyor in establishing it. Its location may, 
however, have been preserved beyond all question by 
acts of land owners, and by the memory of those who 
knew and recollect the true situs of the original 
monument. In such case it is not a lost corner. 
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Dorsey v. Ryan, (supra.) 
The direction in (Irvin v. Rotramel, 68 111. 11, 
(1873)) to establish lost corners by reference to 
known government corners requires, at a minimum, 
reference to an obliterated corner which is one 
whose location may be recovered beyond a reasonable 
doubt by the testimony of landowners, witnesses, or 
acceptable record evidence. 
Henrie v. Hyer, (supra.) 
It is conceded, as it must be, that the original 
corners as established by the government surveyors, 
if they can be found, or the places where they were 
originally established, if that can be definitely 
determined, are conclusive on all persons owning or 
claiming to hold with reference to such survey and 
the monuments placed by the original surveyor 
without regard to whether they were correctly 
located or not. Surveyors, in making resurveys or 
in searching for or relocating or re-establishing 
lost or obliterated corners, may consider extrinsic 
and material evidence, as well as the field notes, 
if there is doubt or uncertainty in the field notes, 
for the purpose of determining the exact location of 
lost lines or corners of the original survey. 
Monuments control over courses and distances. 
Washington Rock Co. y Young, 29 Utah, 108, 80 P. 
382, 110 Am.St.Rep. 666. 
Staff v. Bilder, 415 P.2d 650 (Wash 1966) citing Stewart v. Hoffman, 64 
Wash.2d 37, 390 P.2d 553 (1964) and 11 C.J.S. Boundaries Section 49c 
(1938): 
Courts should ascertain and carry out the intention 
of the original platter's. In case of discrepancy, 
however, between lines actually marked or surveyed 
on the ground and lines called for by plats, maps or 
field notes, the lines marked by survey on the 
ground prevail save for intervening equities arising 
by contract, conveyance, estoppel, prescription, or 
the application of well-defined legal and equitable 
concepts. 
(see also Clark, Surveying and Boundaries Section 
258 (3rd ed. 1959)). 
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Washington Nickel Mining & Alloys, Inc. v. Martin, 534 P.2d 59 (Wash. 
App. 1975) citing Inrrpn v. Pearson, 47 Wash. 402, 92 P. 279: 
But it does not follow that, if there be evidence of 
a corner which has been destroyed or obliterated by 
the lapse of time, a court will direct the 
establishment of a corner under the rule stated, or 
any other rule, for the law establishes an 
obliterated corner where the surveyor actually 
located it, and not where it ought to be located by 
a correct survey. 
In the event a survey using the "obliterated corner1 f 
as the point of beginning fails to resolve the 
dispute between the parties, then the parties may 
seek a determination of the location of the disputed 
boundary line in a future action. 
If the corner is not located beyond a reasonable doubt, it is a 
lost corner and must be reestablished by proportionate measurement 
Qfenual of Surveying Instructions-1973, p. 133, supra.) Henrie v. Hyer, 
supra. 
A lost corner is one whose position cannot be 
determined beyond reasonable doubt, either from 
original marks or reliable external evidence. 
Resort should be had, first, to the monuments placed 
at the various corners when the original government 
survey of the land was made, provided they are still 
in existence and can be identified, or can be 
relocated by the aid of any attainable data. But if 
this cannot be done and a survey becomes necessary, 
this must be made from the east, and not from the 
west, boundary line of the township (Mason v. 
Braught, 33 S.D. 559, 146 N.W. 687, 688.) 
The Utah Supreme Court in Cornia v. Putnam, 489 P.2d 1001 (Utah 
1971). stated: 
In the relocation or re-establishnent of government 
corners, there is a distinction drawn between an 
obliterated corner and a lost corner; in the 
former, the investigation is directed toward the 
determination of its original location; while in the 
latter, the corner is relocated by a new survey... 
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A lost corner is one which cannot be replaced by 
reference to any existing data or sources of 
information, although it is not necessary that 
evidence of its physical location may be seen or 
that one who has seen the marked corner be produced. 
A corner will not be regarded as lost where it may 
be located by field notes referring to discoverable 
natural objects (Chandler v. Hibberd, 165 Cal.App.2d 
39, 332 P.2d 133, 141 (1958)). 
In Reid v. Dunn, 201 Gal.App.2d 612, 20 Cal.Rptr. 
273, 275 (1962) the Court observed that if there be 
some acceptable evidence of the original location, 
that position will be employed in preference to the 
rule that would be applied to a lost corner. The 
Court stated: 
"(I)f monuments are obliterated and undiscoverable, 
corners should be re-established wherever possible 
in accordance with natural objects described in the 
field notes of the original survey. And the 
proportional method must not be resorted to unless 
the line cannot be retraced and its corners 
relocated by reference to natural objects of the 
field notes and all other prescribed methods fail." 
(see also Washington Nickel Mining & Alloys, Inc. v. 
Marin, supra citing Martin v. Neeley^ 55 Wash.2d 
219, 222-23, 347 P.2d 529, 530 (1959).) 
Dorsey v. Ryan, supra. 
All lost section and quarter-section corners on the 
township boundary lines will be restored by single 
proportionate measurement between the nearest 
identified corners on opposite sides of the missing 
corner, north and south on a meridional line or east 
and west on a latitudinal line. 
United States v. Citko, 517 F.Supp. 233 (1981) 
For a corner to be lost it T!must be so completely 
lost that (it) cannot be replaced by reference to 
any existing data or other sources of information.M 
(cites omitted.) The decision that a corner is lost 
should not be made until every means has been 
exercised that might aid in identifying; its true 
original position, (cite omitted). Even though the 
physical evidence of a corner may have entirely 
disappeared, a corner cannot be regarded as lost if 
its position can be recovered through the testimony 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of one or more witnesses who have a dependable 
knowledge of the original location. 
Appellants presented evidence at trial to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 
Providence Farm Survey is located at the point frequently referred to as 
the ffLarsen Fence Corner11. This they accomplished by the unrefuted 
evidence regarding old fences erected along the lines of possession of 
various lot owners, record titles, measurements between known points, 
unofficial plats, an aerial photo, and the testimony of experts in 
survey law, according to the procedures set forth in the Manual of 
Surveying Instructions - 1973, supra. 
Respondents did not refute Appellants1 evidence, but merely added 
some measurements derived from the scaled dimensions of the Martineau 
Plat. Respondents then disputed the legal significance and legal 
interpretation of the evidence. Respondents claim that their evidence 
is legally sufficient to establish the corner as they claim in spite of 
not following the procedures set forth in the Manual of Surveying 
Instructions - 1973. Appellants claim that Respondents present no 
evidence which either legally or sufficiently supports their position, 
even if viewed in the light most favorable to their case. Respondentsf 
interpretation of their own evidence fails to establish anything except 
some non-probative distances on the ground which do not conclusively 
establish their claim or refute Appellants1 claim beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
When the facts of this case are interpreted according to survey 
law, reasonable minds cannot differ as to the outcome of this case. 
There is no factual dispute to be determined by a jury. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Even if the Appellants1 evidence, as viewed in the light most 
favorable to Respondents1 case, were ruled not to establish the corner 
beyond a reasonable doubt and the corner were thus ruled to be lost 
rather than obliterated, Appellants should still prevail because their 
surveyor has already gone through the procedures for restoring a lost 
corner as set forth in the Manual of Surveying Instructions - 1973 p. 
133, ie. through single proportionate measurement. Respondents have not 
even attempted such a restoration. 
Appellants now discuss general Arguments and will later reply to 
Respondents' Brief point by point. 
Argument 1. What evidence is necessary and how it is to be used to 
establish the position of a disputed corner beyond a reasonable doubt is 
a matter of law, established over many years, after much practical 
experience, and documented in numerous cases (see Henrie v. Hyer, supra, 
Cornia v. Putnam, supra, San Juan v. Ayer, supra, Dorsey v. Ryan, supra, 
United States v. Citko, supra, Palmer v. Fitzpatrick, infra, Hook 
v.Horner, infra, etc.) The cases refer to the Manual of Surveying 
Instructions, based in part on 43 U.S.C. Sections 751, 752, and 753, and 
published by the U.S. Department of the Interior, and use it as a 
primary source of lawful survey procedure. Chapter V entitled 
"Restoration of Lost or Obliterated Corners'1 and the pamphlets based 
thereon are especially applicable to the present case. Utah, 
Washington, Idaho, Illinois and Montana all, as a matter of law, require 
surveyors to follow the procedures outlined in the Manual. 
12 
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Barbizon of Utah, Inc. v. General Oil Company, 471 P. 2d 148 (Utah 
1970) citing Vaught v. McClymond 144 P.2d 612 (Mont 1945) and 43 
U.S.C.A. Sections 751, 752, and 753: 
When lands are granted according to an official plat 
of a survey, the plat itself, with all its notes, 
lines, descriptions and landmarks, becomes as much a 
part of the grant or deed by which they are 
conveyed, and controls so far as limits are 
concerned, as if such descriptive features were 
written out on the fact of the deed or grant 
itself... 
Congress has provided a system for the survey of 
public lands, and the boundaries and limits of the 
several sections and subdivisions thereof, including 
quarter sections, must be ascertained in conformity 
with the principles laid down in the federal 
statutes... 
To find the common corner or quarter sections or the 
legal center of a section of land, straight lines 
must be run from the quarter section corners on the 
boundary of the section to the opposite quarter 
corners, the point of intersection constituting the 
legal center, and the boundary line between two 
quarters cannot be legally established by measuring 
along one side of the section 160 rods,. ~ 
But the government surveys are, as a matter of law, 
the best evidence; and, if the boundaries of land 
are clearly established thereby, other evidence is 
superfluous and may be excluded; the best evidence 
is the corners actually fixed upon the ground by ^  the 
government surveyor, in default of which the field 
notes and plats come next, unless satisfactory 
evidence is produced that the corner was actually 
located upon the ground at a point different from 
that stated in the field notes... 
Any section corner or quarter corner that is 
identified as having been established by an official 
survey of the United States government must stand as 
being correctly located, however plain it may appear 
that the location is wrong; because the government 
surveys cannot be changed in an action at law 
between individuals.11 
13 
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Vaught v. McClymond 144 P.2d 612 (Want 1945) citing 43 U.S.C.A. Sections 
751, 752 and various cases) 
In ascertaining the lines of land or in 
re-establishing the lines of a survey, the footsteps 
of the original surveyor, so far as discoverable on 
the ground, should be followed and it is immaterial 
if the lines actually run by the original surveyor 
are incorrect. Ayers v, Watson, 137 U.S. 584, 11 
S.Ct. 201, 34 L.Ed. 803; Gait v. Willingham, 11 F.2d 
757. — 
In surveying a tract of land according to a former 
plat or survey, the surveyorTs only duty is to 
relocate, upon the best evidence obtainable, the 
courses and lines at the same place where originally 
located by the first surveyor on the ground. In 
making the resurvey, he has the right to use the 
field notes of the original survey. The object of a 
resurvey is to furnish proof of the location of the 
lost lines or monuments, not to dispute the 
correctness of or to control the original survey. 
The original survey in all cases must, whenever 
possible, be retraced, since it cannot be 
disregarded or needlessly altered after property -x 
rights have been acquired in reliance upon it. On a 
resurvey to establish lost boundaries, if the 
original corners can be found, the places where they 
were originally established are conclusive without 
regard to whether they were in fact correctly 
located. 8 Am.Jur. Boundaries, Section 102, p. 819. I 
The Idaho Supreme Court in adopting the rule that the Manual of 
Instructions for the Survey of the Public Lands of the United 
States-1973 is law (Hook v. Horner, 517 P.2d 554 (Idaho 1973) and < 
Palmer v. Fitzpatrick, 557 P.2d 203 (Idaho 1976) further stated that any 
survey not based thereon is not substantive evidence. Hook v. Horner, 
517 P.2d 554, 558 (Idaho 1973) held: i 
(W)e agree with respondents' contention that without 
the field notes of the Ashley survey, or other 
evidence indicating that the survey was conducted in 
accordance with the United States Manual of 
Surveying Instructions... it cannot be admitted as 1 
substantive evidence... 
14 
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Even if the Ashley survey had been admitted for 
illustrative purposes, it would not have provided "a 
legal basis upon which Booth could base his survey, 
since it would not have been substantive 
evidence..." 
In the present case, Respondents' experts do not base their 
testimony or methods on the Manual of Surveying Instructions. 
Respondents' Brief has completely ignored the importance of the law in 
this matter, and has not specifically cited any fact in dispute, 
preferring to establish the corner on the basis of alleged stipulations, 
waivers, and the determination of law by a jury. 
In Cornia v. Putnam, 489 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1971), the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled as illegal a surveying technique used by Mr. Irwin Mbser 
who, interestingly was Respondents' surveyor's instructor (see 
T.V.II,p.103.1.16-18). Mbser's theory was stated as follows: 
(I)f you have one or more in-place original 
monuments located anywhere in the township and you 
have the angles and distances from the original 
field notes, the exact location of a disputed line 
can be determined, even though it is necessary to 
cross over lost or obliterated corners." 
In the instant case, Bott (Miser's student), used a similar 
technique to arrive at what Respondents claim is the Northeast corner of 
Lot 12, Block 34. Bott began at the undisputed Southeast corner of Lot 
12, Block 34 and, using the scaled distances he assumed and derived from 
the Martineau plat, measured up to what he considered the Northeast 
corner of Lot 12. Such is not the procedure for reestablishing an 
obliterated corner or relocating a lost corner as set forth in the 
Manual. Bott admitted he was only "somewhat familiar" with the history 
of platting of properties in Cache County (T.V.II,p. 140,1.14-17) and 
based his knowledge of the law on Black's Law Dictionary, (T.V.II 
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p. 106,1.7-13). It is interesting to note that Bott erred by 33 feet in 
this case just as his instructor, Mbser, erred by 33 feet in Cornia v. 
Putnam. 
The reason for Bottf s survey being against survey law and not 
merely a "difference of opinion" as Respondents claim in their Brief at 
page 17 is easily seen by applying Bott's method of scaling and 
measurement from a different beginning point. By law, the recovered 
corner should be locatable from any direction (beyond a reasonable 
doubt). As the basis for re-establishing a disputed corner, there is no 
justification for measuring in a single line from one known corner, any 
more than for measuring in a single line either east-west or north south 
from any of the other known corners. Thus, there is no basis for Bott's 
preferring his measurement from the Southeast Corner of Lot 12 over a 
measurement using his method from the Northeast Corner of Block 8. 
However, when Bottfs method of scaling and measuring is used beginning 
at the Northeast Corner of Lot 17, Block 8, neither the Southeast Corner 
of Lot 1, Block 8 nor the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 can be 
recovered. The Southeast Corner of Lot 1, Block 8 is just as much in 
doubt as the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34, using Bott's 
scale-and-measure method. Therefore, even though the Southeast corner 
of Lot 1, Block 8 is just across the gravel lane frcm the Northeast 
Corner of Lot 12, Block 34, the former cannot be used to establish the 
latter. Neither point is useful in support of Bott's contentions that 
there was ever a 66-foot road established at the gravel lane. Likewise 
700 South Street, used as a point of reference by Bott, is a recent 
addition to Block 8 and was not even anticipated by the Martineau Survey 
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or any plats based thereon. It is therefore not evidence in support of 
the original survey and cannot be used to locate the Northeast Corner of 
Lot 12. Appellants1 surveyor used the Northeast corner of Lot 17, Block 
8 (an undisputed, known corner) as a reference point together with the 
Southeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 (also known and undisputed) to 
determine the location of the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34. 
The plats introduced by both Appellants and Respondents at trial 
were admitted only for the purpose of showing relative sizes and shapes 
of properties in the area, not to determine actual dimensions as they 
exist on the ground, not to determine that a 66-foot road was ever 
established by an original survey, not to determine the location of the 
disputed corner. They are not official maps or plats of the original 
survey within the meaning of Section 57-5-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended) (T.V.II,p.64,1.18-p.65,l.l, also T.V.III,p.43,1.7-10) nor 
are they probative evidence according to the Manual in light of the 
evidence that exists on the ground, including lines of possession, and 
record titles. In short, they are just drawings. 
Thus the Bott survey is not probative to determine the location of 
an obliterated corner. 
His method is not equivalent to using proportional measurement to 
determine a lost corner either, and therefore has no substantive value 
in determining the disputed corner (see Cornia v. Putnam, supra, citing 
Reid v. Dunn, 201 Cal.App.2d 612, 20 Cal.Rptr. 273, 277-278 (1962)). 
Argument 2. The Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 is either an 
obliterated or a lost corner. Any party desiring to establish it at a 
particular point has the burden of proving the location beyond a 
17 
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reasonable doubt. In the event that no one can establish the corner 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it must be relocated by proportionate 
measurement according to the Manual of Instnactions for the Survey of 
the Public Lands of the United States-1973, supra. It is not 
acceptable, for example, to use the single scale-and-measure method used 
in the Bott survey. The Washington Supreme Court discusses the 
development of Beyond A Reasonable Doubt as the standard of proof in the 
case of a disputed corner in San Juan County v. Ayer, 604 P.2d 1304 
(Wash.App., 1980) citing the Manual of Instructions for the Survey of 
the Public Lands of the United States-1973, Sections 5-9 at p.130 (1973 
^nual): 
Both parties rely upon the Manual and are in 
agreement that Washington courts and surveyors are 
required to follow the instructions of the Manual. 
King v. Carmichael, 45 Wash. 127, 87 P. 1120 (1906).
 1 
The (Washington) court first considered the 
dichotomy between a lost, as opposed to an 
obliterated, corner in King v. Carmichael, 45 Wash. 
127, 87 P. 1120 (1906) at 1121, and upheld the trial 
court fs determination that the corner was lost I 
without suggesting what the burden of proof must be; 
the court indicated that the case "presented a 
question of fact onl/1 and that "we are not inclined 
to disturb the findings of the trial court.11 The 
lost corner vis-a-vis obliterated corner issue 
appeared again in Inmon v. Pearson, 47 Wash. 402, 92 ( 
P. 279 (1907), and then again in Hale v. Ball, 70 
Wash. 435, 441, 126 P. 942, 944 (1912), where the 
(Washington) court summarized the applicable rules: 
f!We conceive that there is a distinction between a 
lost corner and a corner the markings of which have < 
been obliterated. If no monument or marking of a 
quarter corner can be found or the testimony of its 
location be overcome by better evidence, a court 
will decree the establishment of a corner under the 
rule prevailing in the land department of the United 
States; that is, at a point equidistant frcm the ' 
section corners. But it does not follow that, if 
there be evidence of a corner which has been 18 
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destroyed or obliterated by the lapse of time, a 
court will direct the establishment of a corner 
under the rule stated, or any other rule, for the 
law establishes an obliterated corner where the 
surveyor actually located it, and not where it ought 
to be located by a correct survey.11 
The standard of proof then evolved in Washington from "a 
preponderance of the evidence," to "clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence," and then to the !beyond a reasonable doubt" standard clearly 
set forth in the language of the Manual. 
The rationale for requiring proof !'beyond a 
reasonable doubt" has been well stated in Greer v. 
Squire, 9 Wash.359, 364, 37 P. 545 (1894). There 
are strong policy considerations favoring the 
retention of a comer once marked on the ground by 
the government surveyor even though that is a point 
which other surveyors might upon resurveys agree is 
in error. The directive of the Manual reflects 
experiences accumulated over the years by those who 
surveyed the continental United States and 
anticipated the problems of ascertaining obliterated 
corners. Their cons icier ed judgment that the 
establishment of an Obliterated corner1 T should 
require the highest degree of proof reflects an 
acknowledgement that error was bound to be made by 
surveyors~subject to human frailties. Thus the GLO 
prefers the reestalbishment of a lost corner by the 
proportionate method rather than reliance upon 
evidence of its original location that is open to 
doubt. To lend certainty to an area that might 
otherwise lead to "great confusion and litigation^ 
the Manual requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of the original location of the point. * 
We hold that a party seeking to recover the location 
of an obliterated surveying point must sustain the 
burden of proving the location of that point beyond 
a reaosnable doubt! 
The policy basis set forth above is compatible with that set forth 
in Cragin v. Powell, 128 U.S. 691, 9 S.Ct. 203, 32 L.Ed. 566 (1888) 
cited in Greer v. Squire, 9 Wash.359, 364, 37 P. 545 (1894) as follows: 
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The power to make and correct surveys of the public 
land belongs to the political department of the 
government; "and the reason of this rule,11 says the 
court, quoting...Haydel v. Dufresne, 17 How. 23, (30, 
15 L.Ed. 115 (1854)) "is that great confusion and 
litigation would ensue "if the judicial tribunals, 
state and federal, were permitted to interfere and 
overthrow the public surveys on no other ground than 
an opinion that they cound have the work in the 
field better done, and divisions more equitably 
made, than the department of public lands cound do." 
Thus (the Washington) court early declared that "the 
true corner is where the United States Surveyor 
established it, notwithstanding its location may not 
be such as is designated in the plat or field notes. 
The Washington court in San Juan v. Ayer, supra, citing State v. 
Green, 91 Wash.2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979), reconsideration granted, 92 
Wash. 2d 1103 (1979) discussed the standard of appelate review and 
concluded by holding that: 
Despite the seemingly higher standard adopted by the 
court in "Sego" for appellate review of clear, 
cogent and convincing evidence, the standard for • 
review of beyond a reasonable doubt evidence remains 
the "substantial evidence test." 
The Utah Supreme Court has since 1937 (see Henrie v. Hyer, 70 P.2d 
154, 156 (Utah 1937)) recognized that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
required to establish an obliterated corner. 
It was prejudicial error in this case not to require the 
Respondents to prove the location of the obliterated corner beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Argument 3. It was also prejudicial error to submit this case to a 
jury. There are no material questions of fact which need to be resolved 
to determine the location of the disputed corner (in spite of the 
general allegations of Respondentsf counsel in their Brief). Appellants 
and Respondents essentially agree on the facts. Bott!s measurements to 
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known points are not in dispute. In fact, all survey measurements 
presented were in agreement to within a few feet. Other pertinent facts 
such as the nature and location of old fences, etc., are not in dispute 
(see Summary of Facts above). What is_ in dispute are the legal 
implications of the facts and Bottfs application of the facts to unknown 
points. The application of the facts to determine a point is a matter 
of carefully developed law (see Manual of Surveying Instructions, 
supra.) Thus Appellants contest the Respondents1 application of law to 
the facts of this case, not the facts themselves. (See also Sections 
78-21-1 and 3 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), Holland v. Wilson, 
327 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1958), and Appellants1 Brief pp. 21-22.) 
Argument 4. The Supreme Court may reverse the verdict in this 
matter or grant a new trial on the basis of the verdict not being 
supported by substantial evidence and because substantial, prejudicial 
errors were committed at trial, including: 
a. Submitting this matter of law to a jury. 
b. Failure to require Respondents to prove their case beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
c. Failing to propertly instruct the jury (see Appellants1 
Brief, pp.23-26) 
d. Failing to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict or 
in the alternative a new trial. 
State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1977), 
This Court will notice the failure to give an 
instruction even though it was not requested when 
the failure to give it would plainly result in a 
miscarriage of justice. 
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State v. Evans, No. 18482 Utah State Bulletin, August 15, 1983, 
We recognize that, had the instructions which were 
given been erroneous to such an extent that they 
prevented a fair determination of the issues or 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, we are at 
liberty to notice the error irrespective of 
counsel's failure to preserve it." Citations 
omitted. 
Anderson v. Toone, No. 17924 Utah State Bulletin, October 15, 1983 
citing Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982), 
The trial court has wide discretion to grant or deny 
a motino for a new trial and we do not reverse a 
denial unless the fevidence to support the verdict 
was completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust. f (citations omitted). 
Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Square D. Company, No. 17546 Utah 
State Bulletin, September 15, 1983 citing Williams v. Lloyd, 16 
Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166, 167 (1965), 
This Court has occasionally exercised its discretion 
in the absence of proper objections and reviewed 
instructions given or not given. But we have said 
that this should be done 'only under unusual 
circumstances where the interests of justice 
urgently so demand.f 
Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980) 
citing Nelson v. Watts, 563 P.2d 798, 799 (Utah 1977), 
In viewing this evidence, this Court will upset the 
jury verdict only upon a showing by the appealing 
party that the evidence so clearly preponderates in 
his favor reasonable people could not differ on the 
outcome of the case. Also, in determining if there 
was sufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdict this Court will consider those facts which 
most strongly support the verdict and where there is 
any conflict in the evidence this Court will 
consider as true that evidence which supports the 
verdict. 
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State v. Pierce, 655 p.2d 677 (Utah 1982), 
This can be done (entertain an issue for the first 
time on appeal) in rare cases under Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, or under such exceptions as 
this Court considers of momentous concern in 
protecting constitutional rights previously waived, 
(citations omitted.) 
State v. Lesley, No. 18038 Utah State Bulletin, October 1, 1983, citing 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
This Court has discretion to review the allegedly 
erroneous admission of evidence when the grounds of 
objection are not clearly or correctly stated. 
Argument 5, To permit the judgment and decision of the District 
Court to stand in light of substantial, prejudicial error, denies 
Appellants equal protection of the law, guaranteed pursuant to Article 
I, Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah, and Amendment XIV, Section 1, 
of the Constitution of the United States. It also violates Appellants1 
right to due process .provided in Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution of Utah and Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the Constitution of 
the United States. 
Furthermore, the decision impacts on others, not parties to this 
action so as to deny than equal protection of the law, guaranteed 
pursuant to Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah, and 
Amendment XIV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States and 
violates their right to due process provided in Article I, Section 7 of 
the Constitution of Utah and Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
To deprive Appellants of the right to rely on a survey corners set 
by law beyond a reasonable doubt, is to selectively apply the law in 
violation of Appellants' right to equal protection. To establish an 
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obliterated or lost corner except as provided by law violates 
Appellants1 right to due process. 
To permit a judgment or decision to impact on the property rights 
of others not parties to the dispute to unsettle their property 
descriptions, denies them equal protection and due. process as well. 
Appellants now reply to the Respondents1 Brief point by point. 
Point 1. (see Respondents1 Brief (RB) p. 1, Nature of the Case) 
Whether Respondents or Appellants have title to the disputed 
property depends on the location of the beginning points in their deeds 
as intended by the deed writers, not merely as originally surveyed. 
Contrary to Respondents' assertion that f,the parties waived all 
other claims," Appellants never stipulated to refrain from reforming 
their deeds, to give Respondents more land than their pleadings called 
for, or to give up any other rights of possession in the event an 
"original1 f Northeast Corner of Lot 12 were located at some point other 
than the one presently relied upon. 
Point 2. (see RB p.2 paragraph 1, Statement of Facts) 
With regard to Respondents1 assertion that Appellants began 
claiming land north of a fence existing in 1969 shortly after Appellants 
acquired their land; there was no fence on roughly the west half of the 
property (T.V.I, p.35,1.11-13, T.V.II, p.76, 1.2-9 see Appellants' Brief 
p. 28, note 7). Respondents extended the partial angular fence to the 
west boundary line in about 1977. It has been taken down, re-angled and 
disputed ever since. 
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In any event, such fact, even if true, is not supportive of the 
Respondents1 claim for the location of the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, 
Block 34 as originally surveyed. 
Point 3. (see RB p. 2 paragraph 2, Statement of Facts) 
Respondents1 statement, ffIt was discovered that the original 
northeast corner of Lot 12, Block 34.. .was 33 feet south of where 
Plaintiffs claim." is false. No evidence was presented at trial in 
support of such a statement nor would such evidence been probative to 
locate the disputed corner. Respondents1 statement should alert the 
Court that Respondents, not Appellants, devised the idea to move the 
corner, which even they believed, until shorly before trial, was at the 
location claimed by Appellants. 
Point 4. (see RB p. 2 last sentence, Statement of Facts) 
Regarding Respondents1 claim that they are now entitled to land 
south of the existing fence (land never before in dispute); Respondents 
acquire no title to any property by virtue of this action nor are they 
entitled to a remedy which they have not pled and for which Appellants 
have had no notice, (see Washington Nickel Mining & Alloys, Inc. v. 
Martin, supra.) 
Point 5. (see RB p. 3 paragraph 2, Statement of Facts) 
Holland v. Wilson, 327 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1958) set forth the 
standard that a jury trial was appropriate only to decide questions of 
fact. Even if the District Court did not understand prior to trial that 
there were no factual issues in this matter requiring jury resolution, 
the Court should still have granted Appellants' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New Trial. To permit a jury to 
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decide the law is to require of then the expertise of a judge and is 
itself contrary to law. In short, even though the jury did its best to 
determine Ma preponderance of the evidence1 f, its verdict could not have 
been anything but arbitrary. 
Appellants respectfully submit that the verdict in this matter, 
if allowed to stand, establishes "stipulation", "jury determination of 
law", and the standard of "preponderance of the illusory evidence" as 
legal methods for relocating obliterated or lost corners. 
Point 6. (see RB pp.3-5, Right to Jury Trial) 
Respondents' assertion that they are entitled to a jury trial is 
only valid to the extent that there are factual questions to be decided. 
Appellants objected to a trial by jury because the issues to be resolved 
were legal, and because there were no essential facts in dispute. 
In spite of Respondentsf claims that the location of the disputed 
corner was a question of fact, the definition and location of the 
Northeast Coiner of Lot 12, Block 34 can be matters both of law and 
fact. But the facts material to the location of the corner are not in 
dispute (see Argument 1 above). There is no substantial, probative, or 
lawful evidence which supports the Respondents1 position and it was 
prejudicial error to refer the matter to a jury for determination. 
Point 7. (see RB p.5, Right, to Jury Trial) 
Respondents1 statement, "At trial Plaintiffs contended that the 
original Northeast Corner had moved and changed frcm where it had been 
placed," is false. Appellants made no such statement. Rather, 
Appellants maintained that the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 is 
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and always has been at what is presently called the "Larsen Fence 
Corner." 
Respondents contend that the original northeast corner..."was 
located where the plats, surveys, deeds and other records indicated it 
would be, i.e. 1320 feet directly north of the southeast corner of Lot 
12, Block 34..." The deeds, plats, lawful surveys and other records 
indicate plainly on their face that 
a. the northeast corner of Lot 12, Block 34 is approximately 
1350 feet north of the southeast corner of Lot 12, Block 34. 
b. the southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 8 is approximately 
1350 south of the northeast comer of Lot 17, Block 8 
c. there is a 33-foot road separating than. 
d. Respondents' assumptions regarding a "standard" 1320 foot 
Block, the existence of a 66-foot road, and the location of the south 
line and southeast corner of Block 8 are conpletely unfounded. 
(Respondents actually derive their measurements from the scale of a 
plat, as previously discussed, in spite of all other deeds and other 
records, and not from deeds, official plats or official surveys as they 
claim.) 
Point 8. (see RB p.5ff, ARGUMENTS II and III) 
In spite of Respondents' general assertions, there is no 
substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict or the District 
Court's decision, and there has been substantial and prejudicial error 
committed at trial. (See Arguments above). 
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Point 9. (see RB p.8, paragraph 1, Evidence in Support of Jury 
Verdict) 
Respondents1 list of lfevidencen in support of the jury's verdict 
contains nothing material or substantial that supports their claim for 
locating the disputed corner in a mariner prescribed by law as set forth 
in the Manual of Surveying Instructions - 1973. (see Arguments above). 
Point 10. (see RB p.8, last paragraph, Evidence in Support of Jury 
Verdict) 
Appellants1 do not object to Respondents' right to use evidence 
submitted by Appellants at trial. Appellants do object however to the 
unlawful interpretation of the evidence beyond the purposes for which it 
was admitted, specifically in regard to the Martineau Plat, Exhibit #1. 
It is not proper and lawful survey practice to conclude from a scaled 
measurement of an unofficial plat the exact measurements of a Lot, 
especially in light of more conclusive evidence. The Martineau Plat is 
a valuable and useful document. But there was no evidence that it was 
established on the ground or approved as an official plat. No field 
notes of a corresponding survey were found, and it gave no calls for the 
dimensions of Lot 12. It was drawn to scale, thus showing approximate 
anticipated dimensions and relationships between various properties. 
Respondents' confuse the admissibility of evidence with its 
probative value as established by law, e.g. that evidence of 
long-standing lines of possession on the ground which conform with 
record titles take precedence over tax plats and measurements in 
determining the foot-steps of the original surveyor, (see Diehl v. 
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Zanger, 39 Mich 601 (1878) and also Brown, Evidence and Procedures for 
Boundary Location, cited in Appellants1 Brief at pp.17-19). 
Though Respondents claim the priority and relative weight of 
evidence is the sole province of the jury, the cases cited refer to fact 
questions and not issues of law. 
11 C.J.S. Boundaries, Section 118, p. 728. 
The relative weight to be given evidence of disputed 
boundaries such as natural monuments, artificial 
marks, courses and distances, and the like, is 
ordinarily a question of law. 
Point 11. (see RB pp.8-9, Evidence in Support of Jury Verdict) 
With regard to Respondents1 claimed measurements, Appellants do not 
dispute the ability of Bott to measure distances in the field. 
Appellants do, however, dispute the purported legal conclusions of his 
survey. 
Respondents have the burden of establishing the disputed corner 
beyond a reasonable doubt in spite of what Appellants prove. 
Respondents1 claims cannot be established by default. 
Point 12. (see RB pp. 9-13, Evidence in Support of Jury Verdict) 
The Eden Akers subdivision (Exhibit 24) referred to as Respondentsf 
evidence is relatively recent (1961), is not in Lot 12, and its 
dimensions are irrelevant to a determination of the disputed corner. 
None of the other plats submitted by Respondents purport to be 
surveys or official survey plats and are merely to show general 
relationships between the properties. 
9Q 
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Point 13. (see RB p. 10, line 9ff, Evidence in Support of Jury 
Verdict) 
Respondents claim to know the location of the north side of 800 
South Street. However, the position of the north side of 800 South 
Street is unknown, given the 66-foot right-of-way asserted by the Bott 
survey. The road is actually only 33 feet wide. Thus Respondents 
cannot use the position of the north side of 800 South Street to 
determine the south side of the road. If the original surveyor actually 
intended and established a 33-foot wide road, as presently exists, and 
not the 66-foot road Respondents claim, all other points relied upon in 
Lot 12 match with measurements called for in the deeds, not the Bott 
survey. 
Point 14. (see RB p.11, Evidence in Support of Jury Verdict) 
In trying to prove that Lot 12 is 1320 feet long, Respondents rely 
on non-legal and non-probative evidence (illusory evidence) which even 
if accepted in the light most favorable to Respondents1 case is 
inconclusive. Respondents ignore conclusive proof that it is longer. 
Some of the evidence ignored is briefly outlined here. 
(a) The aerial photograph (Exhibit 3) and measurements in the field 
(including Respondents1 own measurements if interpreted properly) show 
excess land in the ground covered by the Martineau Plat (see map in 
Appellantsf Brief). This is not by any means an unusual situation (see 
Appellants1 Brief p. 15 and *Cornia v. Putnam, 489 P.2d 1001 (Utah 
1971)). 
(b) The Rreisie to Kreisie deed of 1943 (see Exhibit 12) 
transfered the north part of Lot 12 as a parcel exactly 660 feet (10 
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chains) long, and the entire south part as a parcel to include the 
remaining distance, (referred to as 10.2 chains more or less). Thus the 
"north part'1 is not equal to the "south partff and the excess present 
always remained in the "south part" of Lot 12. Thus also, the length of 
Lot 12 is longer than the 2 x 660 feet or 1320 feet claimed by 
Respondents and Respondents1 method is proven conclusively to be in 
error and non-probative. The M.D. Hammond to Mattie Hansen deed 
(Exhibit 39?) agrees with Appellants1 evidence and the Kreisie deeds 
above-mentioned. 
(c) Hickman's testimony regarding the "standard historical 
distance of lots", is irrelevant, misleading and unfounded because the 
size of lots in the actual area of interest is clear from uncontested 
survey measurements and the aerial photo presented in the trial. The 
length of Block 8 and Lot 12 are each considerably greater than 2 x 1320 
feet implied by Mr. Bott (see appellants brief map, pp.27, 28.) Thus 
there is excess land over that suggested by scaling from the Martineau 
Survey. Inclusions of this excess land obviously makes the length of 
Lot 12 greater than "a standard 1320 feet". Measurements involving 700 
South street are irrelevant because this street is not called for in the 
Martineau Plat. If the present 33-foot gravel lane at 800 South lane 
were to be widened to 66 feet, best evidence indicates that the extra 33 
feet might better come from the north side of the present lane rather 
than from the south side. Thus the southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 8 
would be located 33 feet north of where Bott assumes it to be. Recall, 
however, that there is evidence that a 66-foot roadway was never 
actually laid out in the filed. The roadway ends altogether to the west 
31 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and to the east, and a setback of ten feet on each side of the present 
33 feet lane was called for a few years back in anticipation of 
subdivisions. The 33 foot lane is equitably located, and is consistent 
with deed calls in Lot 12. 
(d) Respondents argue that the deed from M.D. Hammond to Mattie 
Hansen in 1877 indicates that Lot 12, Block 34 was 1320 feet long. 
Actually, their assumption that the "north part of Lot 12" was the same 
length as the south part of Lot 12 is in error as indicated by 
Plaintiffs' exhibit number 12. in the deed of Kreasie to Kreasie , the 
"North part of Lot 12,f is described as being "40 rods" (10 chains) long. 
The "South part of Lot 12" however, is described as extending from its 
south boundary "10.2 chains South from the Northeast corner of said 
lot". Thus this exhibit illustrates two points, viz. (1) Lot 12, Block 
34 was considerably longer than 1320 feet in the 1943 era and earlier, 
and (2) the excess land was in the "South part". This "South part" was 
eventually deeded to Hansen. Thus the Respondents' argument has no 
basis in fact. The deeds, even in the light most favorable to the 
Respondents1 case are clear on their face, despite Respondents' 
assertions to the contrary. 
Point 15. (see KB p.12 last paragraph, Evidence in Support of Jury 
Verdict) 
Appellants do not object to the admission of the Martineau Plat as 
evidence, nor to its proper use, that is, to show relationships between 
properties not actual dimensions from its scale. The Martineau Plat was 
never offered by Plaintiffs as an Official Map or Official Plat of an 
actual survey. Indeed the Mattie Hansen Deed dated January 12, 1877 
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used the designation MLot 12M three years prior to the Martineau Plat of 
1880. The oft-referred-to Martineau Plat is just as Respondents 
surveyors admit, merely a drawing which purports to be based on the 
Martineau Survey. It neither indicates when said survey was performed 
or that Martineau actually made the drawing. 
The Respondents1 claim that other plats in evidence are Mancient 
documents" is wholly without merit. None of the plats submitted by 
Respondents as evidence qualify as ancient documents for purposes of 
this case. Some are not relevant. Some are not verified. Some are tax 
plats. Age is not the sole determinant of an ancient document nor does 
age alone endow an prior irrelevant document with relevance or 
materiality. Such documents must still be interpreted on their face, in 
light of all other evidence. Respondents1 documentary evidence supports 
Appellants1 position when viewed within the framework of the other 
undisputed facts. 
Point 16. (see RB bottom half of p. 13, Verdict Effects Only 
Parties to Trial) 
Despite Respondents1 assertions, the results of this trial, if 
allowed to stand, do affect the accepted position of the Northeast 
Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 for landowners in Lot 12 not parties to this 
action. The Court has established an obliterated or lost corner at a 
location not previously relied on. The location therefore impacts on 
the validity of all deeds which use this point of reference. 
Furthermore, if those deeds are subject to reformation, as the 
Respondents claim, then the Appellants' and Respondents1 deeds are also 
subject to that same reformation and Appellants are still entitled to 
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the disputed property. Appellants did not stipulate away their right to 
deed reformation in such a case. Thus the lower court decision does not 
reoldve the boundary dispute. 
Point 17. (see RB pp. 14-15, Appellant's Failure to Object) 
Appellants objected to the granting of a jury trial, to the jury 
instructions used and moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
As to the jury instructions, there is no question that there was no 
court reporter in the in-chambers discussions and that counsel for 
Appellants failed to enter the objections to the jury instructions in 
the record during the jury deliverations. Appellants attempted to 
remedy the problem by amending the record. The jury instructions set 
forth in Appellants1 Brief are verbatim from the proposed instructions 
and the given instructions copies of which were at the time of trial 
given to all parties and the originals of which Appellants! believe have 
been transmitted to the Supreme Court for review. 
The District Court might well have rendered the matter of the jury 
instructions moot by reviewing the evidence and granting judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Appellants1 Motion. 
Even if Appellants had made no effort to amend the record there has 
still been substantial prejudicial error committed which more than 
permits this Court to intervene (see Arguments above.) 
Point 18. (see RB p.16, Conclusions) 
Appellants1 conclusions differ in essential ways from those of the 
Respondents. 
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a. Appellants have clearly shown substantial and prejudicial error 
in the proceedings, that the verdict is not supported by substantial 
evidence, and that the verdict is against law (see Arguments above). 
b. The Respondents1 statement "the essence of the Plaintiffs1 
appeal is a challenge of the facts not the law.11 is absolutely wrong. 
The appellants do not challenge the facts, only the way the Respondents 
attecnpt to use them. The proper use of the facts is clearly stated in 
survey law as given in the Manual of Instructions for the Survey of the 
Public Lands of the United States - 1973. Measurements of distances, 
and the location of known, real objects like fences and lines of 
possession, are essentially known and agreed to by all parties and 
surveyors. These are the facts. How these facts are to be used to 
determine the intent of the original surveyor (follow the steps of the 
original surveyor) in the restoration of the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, 
Block 34 is a matter of law, carefully spelled out, whether the corner 
be obliterated or lost. It is not a subject for jury determination. 
c. The Appellants have no objection to the Defendants' use of 
evidence the Appellants introduced. Appellants welcome clarificaitons 
from either side. 
d. Respondents1 evidence, including the Bott Survey, clearly 
indicates that all parties acknowledge the intent of the deed writers to 
begin the property descriptions at the point claimed by Appellants as 
the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34 and oft referred to as the 
Larsen Fence Corner. 
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e. The jury should be ccomended for their efforts to weigh the 
evidence. It is unfortunate that they were asked to decide questions of 
law. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Appellants have demonstrated that the j lodgment of the District 
Court is clearly against law and is not supported by substantial 
evidence. Appellants have also indicated that substantial, prejudicial 
errors were committed at trial. 
The evidence now before the Court is sufficient beyond a reasonable 
doubt to establish the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34, Providence 
Survey of Farms at the location claimed by Appellants at the point oft 
referred to at trial as the Larsen Fence Corner. 
Whether the location is for the purpose of determining the intent 
of the deed writers—common grantors of the parties—or to determine the 
nfootsteps!f and intent of the original surveyor, the point is the same. 
Only Appellants' surveys comply with the legal requirements set 
forth in the Manual of Instructions for the Survey of the Public Lands 
of the United States - 1973 for the re-establishment of obliterated 
corners. Furthermore, if, after reviewing the evidence, this Court 
feels that neither party has established the disputed corner beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Appellants1 surveys have already met the requirements 
for the lawful restoration of a lost corner. Both methods indicate the 
true location of the Northeast Corner of Lot 12, Block 34, Providence 
Farm Survey to be as Appellants claim. 
Appellants respectfully request that the Judgment of the District 
Court be reversed and that Judgment be entered in their favor, or in the 
alternative, that a New Trial be granted. 
DATED this 25th day of April, 1984. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Bashawn Barnett , being first duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the office of CHRISTENSEN & HANSEN, Attorneys 
for the Plaintiffs /Appellants herein; that she served the attached 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
(Mailed two copies) 
upon the Defendants/ by placing a true and correct copy thereof in 
Respondents 
an envelope addressed to: James C. Jenkins, JAMES C. JENKINS & ASSOCIATES 
67 East 100 North, Logan, UT 84321 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid 
thereof, in the United States mail at Payson, Utah on the 26th day 
of April 19 84. 
"&%>•]7/U17L rYlMlHh^ 
Secretary 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 25th day of April 1934, 
Residing at Payson, Utah 
My Commission expires November 20, 1984 
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